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Future-Oriented Gang Members?
Gang Finances and the Theory 
of Present-Oriented Criminals
By YAIR LISTOKIN
ABSTRACT. Two prominent theories of crime (Wilson and Herrnstein
1985; Gottfredson and Hirshi 1990) rely heavily on the notion that
criminals are impatient or “present-oriented.” In brief, the theories
posit that present-oriented individuals will be predisposed to crime
because the “costs” of crime (e.g., prison time) lag behind crime’s
benefits. While the theory has intuitive appeal, it remains controver-
sial. This study considers a data set first presented by Levitt and
Venkatesh (2000) that details a drug-selling gang’s activities. In this
gang, low-ranking criminals accept low initial wages in the hope of
receiving high future remunerations. As demonstrated in the note, this
wage structure is exceedingly difficult to reconcile (both theoretically
and empirically) with the notion of present-oriented criminals. In sum,
the study suggests that present orientation is at best an incomplete
and idiosyncratic explanation of the causes of crime.
I
Introduction
NUMEROUS ARTICLES APPEARING OVER THE LAST DECADE (including, among
others, Hay 2001; Wright et al. 2001; Paternoster and Brame 1998;
Dean, Brame, and Piquero 1996; Nagin and Paternoster 1994) have
discussed and evaluated the theories of individual “criminal propen-
sity” formulated by Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) and Gottfredson 
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and Hirschi (1990). These theories attempt to understand criminal
behavior within a rational choice framework. One prominent element
common to both theories is an emphasis on criminals’ “present ori-
entation,” or lack of “self-control.” As summarized by Nagin and 
Paternoster (1994: 584), “individuals who commit crimes place little
weight on the future consequences of their actions.” The supposed
present orientation of criminals helps explain why individuals might
commit crimes even if the pecuniary rewards from crime are low
(Wilson and Abrahamse 1992). As long as the gains from crime are
immediate while the costs of crime are delayed, present-oriented indi-
viduals will commit crimes that are not obviously lucrative.
Present orientation finds some support as a theory of crime. A
theory of stable individual differences, such as present orientation,
helps resolve some puzzles regarding criminal activity, such as the
prevalence of repeat offenders (Nagin and Paternoster 1994; Dean,
Brame, and Piquero 1996) and the frequently low financial returns to
crime.1
The association between criminality and present orientation also
finds some empirical backing. In Nagin and Paternoster (1994), for
example, a student questionnaire revealed that present orientation (as
defined by several questions) is highly associated with the likelihood
of committing a number of crimes and misdemeanors. Dean, Brame,
and Piquero (1996) note that several findings from a statistical analy-
sis of a cohort of North Carolina offenders support the theory that
stable individual differences such as present orientation are an impor-
tant cause of crime. Paternoster and Brame (1998) utilize several
survey variables from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Develop-
ment to define “self-control” in eight- to nine-year-olds. They observe
that children with low self-control disproportionately turn to crime
and other present-oriented behaviors, such as smoking and drinking.
This finding supports the notion that stable individual differences,
such as present orientation, cause crime, rather than more specific
and idiosyncratic factors.
Not all empirical research supports the theory of present-oriented
criminals. All the studies cited in the paragraph above, for example,
report some findings that are inconsistent with the theory. (On
balance, however, these studies clearly do support the theory.) Trem-
blay and Morselli (2000) question the notion that crime does not pay.
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Using the data set employed by Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) to
suggest that criminal earnings are low, they find, by contrast, that for
some individuals crime is quite lucrative. While this finding does not
directly contradict the self-control theory, it does suggest that crime
can be consistent with rational, nonpresent-oriented criminals.
This research note questions the validity of the notion of present-
oriented criminals. It discusses a unique data set described and ana-
lyzed by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) that details the economics of 
a drug-selling criminal gang. Broadening and reinterpreting some of
Levitt and Venkatesh’s findings and data, this note posits that the eco-
nomics of the gang under study is starkly dissonant with the notion
of present-oriented criminals. In brief, the gang’s compensation struc-
ture is highly skewed, requiring gang members to “rise through the
ranks” before earning high wages. As described below, this wage
structure is exceedingly unlikely where individuals are present 
oriented. While gang members are not necessarily representative of
all street criminals, these results suggest that the broader theory of




IN THEIR IMPORTANT RECENT PAPER, LEVITT AND VENKATESH (2000) discuss
a unique data set that can be employed to shed light on the present-
oriented hypothesis. The Levitt and Venkatesh data were “compiled
by the leader of a drug dealing gang to facilitate the gang’s opera-
tions.” The data detail the wage and revenue structure of the gang
over a four-year period.
Two facets of the gang’s wage structure are particularly salient for
the theory of present-oriented criminals. First, Levitt and Venkatesh
(2000: 762) discuss the wages of the lowest level gang members, the
“foot soldiers.” Foot soldiers are the “street-level drug sellers” and are
“typically from 16–22 years of age.” Thus, they fit the typology of the
“radically present-oriented young man” who is “part of a gang” often
described by researchers (DiIulio 1996: 16–17). Levitt and Venkatesh
(2000: 771) also note that the foot soldiers are remunerated at an
“hourly wage that is below the federal minimum wage,” a rate that
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is “strikingly low.” (Over the four years of data, the wage ranges
between $2.50 and $7.10 per hour in inflation-adjusted 1995 dollars.)
They observe that many street-level drug dealers concurrently hold
legitimate sector jobs and live with their families, facts consistent with
low earnings from drug selling.
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000: 757) also demonstrate that the distri-
bution of wages within the gang is “extremely skewed.” The average
“wage” of gang members over the four-year period is two to three
times the wage of the foot soldiers, even though foot soldiers com-
prise over 90 percent of the gang’s wage earners. The wage skew-
ness results from the fact that the gang leader earns 10 to 20 times
as much as a foot soldier (between $32.50 and $97.20 per hour over
the four years). Other high-level gang members also make consider-
ably more than those at the bottom of the hierarchy. The gang leader’s
wages in particular are much higher than the wage that would be
available to an individual with his level of human capital in the legit-
imate sector. Indeed, the leader’s wage is sufficiently high to make
the average wage of gang members greater than their supposed
private sector alternatives. On average, crime does pay for the
members of the gang. The rewards are unequally distributed,
however. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) also note that the average wage
premium over the gang is quite small relative to the added risk of
injury or death associated with gang membership.
In assessing this wage structure, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000: 773)
conclude that “the most reasonable way to view the economic aspects
of the decision to join the gang is as a tournament where the partic-
ipants vie for large awards that only a small fraction will eventually
obtain.” In other words, members of the gang accept low wages in
the present in the hope that they will advance in the gang and earn
well above market wages in the future (Lazear and Rosen 1981).
Levitt and Venkatesh’s conclusion is a reasonable one given the
structure of wages in the gang. Nevertheless, a tournament wage
structure is strikingly inconsistent with the notion of present-oriented
criminals. Levitt and Venkatesh do not note this inconsistency,
however. The supposedly “radically present-oriented” (DiIulio 1996:
16) 16- to 22-year-old foot soldiers of the gang are sacrificing present
wages for the hope of future gains. Indeed, the gang is using the
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same compensation structure as the one commonly used to charac-
terize law firms (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995). The “foot soldiers” 
are filling the role of law associates, a group not known for its 
impulsiveness.
Moreover, foot soldiers seem acutely aware that they are making
an investment in the future by foregoing present gains. As one foot
soldier noted:
You think I wanta be selling drugs on the street my whole life? No way,
But I know these n—[above me] are making more money. . . . So you
know, I figure I got a chance to move up. But if not, s—, I get me a job
doin’ something else. (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000: 773)
This quotation does not comport with the notion of a super-
impulsive young criminal.
Tournament compensation schemes are often used to ensure
maximum effort by low-level employees (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995).
Executives (or gang leaders) offer the prospect of high future wages
in the hierarchy to induce effort by low-wage employees in the
present.2 The prospect of high wages in the second period must
suffice to induce effort in the first period. If there are two levels of
effort and two periods, then the wages for the winner of the tour-
nament (the second-period gang leader) must be high enough to
satisfy the no-shirking condition described by Rebitzer and Taylor
(1995):
(1)
where DW is the difference in second-period salary between becom-
ing a member of the gang hierarchy or not, DP is the difference in
the probability that a foot soldier will make it into the gang hierar-
chy if he exerts high effort in the first period as opposed to shirking
(DP > 0), and DU1 is the difference in first-period utility if a foot 
soldier is shirking gang activity vs. if the foot soldier is working hard
(DU1 > 0; as in the first period, shirking yields more utility since there
is disutility from hard work and the wage will be the same). Finally,
(1 + r) is the foot soldier’s discount rate.









Future-Oriented Gang Members? 1077
the discount rate (r). As one study notes, “the more present-oriented
the individual, the higher his or her discount rate” (Nagin and 
Paternoster 1994: 587). If criminals discount the future at the upper
end of rates commonly estimated for noncriminal individuals (approx-
imately 30 percent per annum, Warner and Pleeter 2001), then Equa-
tion (1) implies (given reasonable estimates for the other parameters,
see below) that the premium offered to those few foot soldiers who
are able to advance to gang leader would have to be astronomically
high to induce impulsive “foot soldiers” to work for long periods at
low wages.
By combining data presented by the Levitt and Venkatesh study
with other estimates, one can (very roughly) estimate the theoretical
wage premium (from Equation (1)) that would be required to induce
present-oriented individuals to work hard and compare this estimate
with the observed wage premium. For present-oriented individuals,
the discount rate is approximately 30 percent annually. Since gang
leadership changed hands only once in the four-year period, this
annual rate will have to be compounded accordingly. DP will be esti-
mated by utilizing the hierarchical structure of the gang. There are
approximately 50 foot soldiers under a gang leader.3 If all foot sol-
diers have equal chances of becoming leaders, then they each have
a 2 percent chance of becoming a leader within a four-year window.
If a gang member shirks, he is assumed to have no chance of becom-
ing a gang leader. Since the equilibrium wage is assumed to prevent
shirking (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995), any foot soldier is assumed to
have a 2 percent chance of becoming gang leader if he exerts effort.
Thus, DP = 0.02.
Estimating DU1 (the difference in first-period utility if a foot soldier
is not actively involved in gang activities (shirking) vs. if the foot
soldier is working hard) is fraught with difficulty. This study proxies
DU1 by employing the added probability of death while active in the
gang vs. shirking violent activities. Levitt and Venkatesh estimate that
gang members value their lives at approximately $100,000, a shock-
ingly low number. Gang members active over the entire four-year
period had mortality rates of 25 percent, while nonactive members
had mortality rates below 2 percent. The estimate for DU1 is thus 
(0.25 - 0.02) *100,000 = $23,000.4 This is the disutility a potential gang
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member receives from the added chance of death associated with
active gang participation. Finally, note that if a gang member becomes
gang leader, he is assumed to stay in that position for life. This
assumption is almost definitely an overestimate given the high mor-
tality rates and job turnover described in this study, and should bias
the estimates presented here toward being consistent with the
present-oriented criminal assumption.
Thus, the implied wage premium DW is given by:
(2)
The actual wage premium, however, is the present discounted value
of the lifetime difference between the gang leader’s wage and the
foot soldier’s wage. The difference in annual salaries for the two 
positions is approximately $100,000 (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000). The
value of a bond that pays $100,000 annually when the discount rate 
is 30 percent per annum is approximately .5
Thus, the assumption that criminals are present-oriented is incon-
sistent with the wage data and structure observed by Levitt and
Venkatesh. The theoretical wage premium required to induce present-
oriented individuals to participate in a tournament-type wage struc-
ture (approximately $3.3 million) is 10 times the observed wage
premium ($333,000). The gap between the theoretical and actual
wages exists in spite of the fact that assumptions (such as lifetime
tenure for gang leaders) were made that should bring the numbers
closer together.
The observed wage structure is consistent with tournament wage
premiums for individuals with ordinary discount rates (5 percent–
10 percent per annum). The theoretical wage premium required for  
individuals with ordinary discount rate is 
$1,507,415 while the present discounted value of the actual premium 
is = $1,428,571. These two numbers correspond closely, 
especially given the necessarily rough nature of the estimates.
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tournament wage structure is strikingly dissonant with the assump-
tion of present-oriented criminals.
III
Conclusion
IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE FOOT SOLDIERS OF THE GANG studied 
by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) are super-impulsive. There are several
other possibilities that can reconcile the apparent contradiction
between high criminal discount rates and the Levitt-Venkatesh data,
however. As with all studies of criminal data, the Levitt and Venkatesh
data may not be reliable. Foot soldiers may receive more compensa-
tion than the data record, rendering the argument presented here
invalid. Levitt and Venkatesh note, however, that the purpose of the
data was to assist in gang management. As a result, the data are likely
to be at least somewhat reliable. Moreover, to the extent that the data
are unreliable, it would probably be biased in favor of high wages
for foot soldiers. In other words, Levitt and Venkatesh believe that, if
anything, the reported wages for foot soldiers are biased upward. If
the gang leader wanted to hide his profits from other affiliated gangs,
for example, then he would have incentive to overstate his expenses,
including his compensation to other gang members.
Another possibility is that the gang studied by Levitt and Venkatesh
is not representative of the average criminal. There is some truth to
this claim. The criminals involved in drug dealing may be different
from car thieves or other violent criminals, for example. They view
gang membership as a career and do not appear to come from notice-
ably different backgrounds than average within their neighborhood
(Levitt and Venkatesh 2001). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the
foot soldiers of the gang are completely unrepresentative of the super-
impulsive criminal described by DiIulio (1996) in his survey article.
As suggested above, “foot soldiers” fit many of the demographic 
characteristics of the stereotypical super-impulsive criminal. They are
young, urban, involved in a gang, deal drugs, and are commonly
involved in street violence, including murder.6 Moreover, even if 
the gang members are not thoroughly representative of other street
criminals, these data still cast doubt on the general theory of 
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impulsive criminals. Gang members are an empirically critical crimi-
nal type, accounting for approximately 20 percent of all homicides in
1997 (National Youth Gang Center 1998). Thus, the data suggest that
the “super-impulsive criminal” theory of crime is incomplete at best.
There may be a way to reconcile the tournament wage structure
described by Levitt and Venkatesh with impulsive criminals. Recall
that DU1, the difference in first-period utility if a foot soldier is 
shirking vs. if the foot soldier is working hard, was very imprecisely
estimated. If active participation in a gang brings psychic benefits,
however, then DU1 may be very low. If DU1 is low enough, then the
observed wage premium may be enough to induce foot soldiers to
participate in the gang, even if foot soldiers are present oriented.
While this explanation helps resolve the apparent contradiction
between the Levitt and Venkatesh data and the assumption of present-
oriented criminals, it does impair the assumption’s value as a theory
of the cause of crime. The low value of DU1 (from the psychic ben-
efits of being part of a gang) is an equally (if not more) important
“cause” of gang membership and crime.
In sum, a careful analysis of the Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) 
study suggests that present orientation is at best an incomplete and
often inapplicable theory of crime. Although the evidence presented
in this research note is only suggestive, scholars should be skeptical
of the present-oriented criminal theory pending further empirical
investigation.
Notes
1. The theory of present-oriented criminals has also been used to derive
several policy recommendations within law. For examples, see Polinsky and
Shavell (1999) and Listokin (2002).
2. The need to induce high effort from the foot soldiers would appear to
be a real one. Levitt and Venkatesh discuss the prevalence of street-level
dealers pilfering inventory from their drug merchandise.
3. Note that there are three gang officers with intermediate ranks inter-
posed between the gang leader and the foot soldiers. These officers receive
relatively low wage premiums, however (Levitt and Venaktesh 2000), so the
analysis does not change substantially if the officers’ wages are included.
4. If the probability of death in the gang is not as high as estimated here
(in other words, if these years have atypically high mortality), the results
Future-Oriented Gang Members? 1081
would not change substantially. While DU1 would go down in these calcula-
tions, the implicit value of life would rise, so that the two effects should coun-
terbalance each other for the purpose of the present calculations.
5. The present discounted value of a bond that pays a dollars every year 
ad infinitum when the interest rate is r is .
6. In the four years studied by Levitt and Venkatesh, violent gang wars
with many fatalities were shockingly frequent.
References
Dean, Charles, Robert Brame, and Alex Piquero. (1996). “Criminal Propensi-
ties, Discret Groups of Offenders, and Persistence in Crime.” Criminol-
ogy 34(4): 547–574.
DiIulio, John Jr. (1996). “Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(1): 3–24.
Gottfredson, Michael, and Travis Hirschi. (1990). A General Theory of Crime.
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hay, Carter. (2001). “Parenting, Self-Control, and Delinquency: A Test of Self-
Control Theory.” Criminology 39(3): 707–736.
Lazear, Edward, and Sherwin Rosen. (1981). “Rank-Order Tournaments as
Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 841–
864.
Levitt, Steven, and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. (2000). “An Economic Analysis
of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
13(4): 755–789.
——. (2001). “Growing Up in the Projects: The Economic Lives of a Cohort
of Men Who Came of Age in Chicago Public Housing.” American Eco-
nomic Review 91(2): 79–84.
Listokin, Yair. (2002). “Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the Existence
of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law.” Journal of Legal Studies 31(1):
99–118.
Nagin, Daniel, and Raymond Paternoster. (1994). “Personal Capital and Social
Control: The Deterrence Implications of Individual Differences in 
Criminal Offending.” Criminology 32(4): 581–606.
National Youth Gang Center. (1998). 1997 National Youth Gang Survey.
Washington, DC: National Criminal Justice Reference System.
Paternoster, Raymond, and Robert Brame. (1998). The Structural Similarity of
Processes Generating Criminal and Analogous Behaviors. Criminology
36(3): 633–669.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. (1999). “On the Disutility and Dis-
counting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence.” Journal of
Legal Studies 28(1): 1–23.
a
r1 -
1082 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology
Rebitzer, James, and Lowell Taylor. (1995). Efficiency Wages and Employment
Rents: The Employer-Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers.
Journal of Labor Economics 13(4): 678–708.
Tremblay, Pierre, and Carlo Morselli. (2000). “Patterns in Criminal Achieve-
ment: Wilson and Abrahamse Revisited.” Criminology 38(2): 633–659.
Warner, John, and Saul Pleeter. (2001). “The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence
from Military Downsizing Programs.” American Economic Review 91(1):
33–53.
Wilson, James Q., and Allan Abrahamse. (1992). “Does Crime Pay?” Justice
Quarterly 9(2): 359–377.
Wilson, James Q., and Richard Herrnstein. (1985). Crime and Human Nature.
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Wright, Bradley, Avshalom Caspi, Terrie Moffit, et al. (2001). “The Effects of
Social Ties on Crime Vary by Criminal Propensity: A Life-Course Model
of Interdependence.” Criminology 39(2): 321–351.
Future-Oriented Gang Members? 1083
